Emil Constantinescu
The former Minister and university professor Victor Babiuc will be interred at Cernica Monastery on Tuesday, February 28th, 2023. I deeply regret that attending an international conference prevents me from accompanying him on his final earthly journey. The sadness overwhelms, because we are, in effect, saying goodbye to a man who left a strong mark not only on the people who knew him personally, but also on his era.
I was a first-year law student when I overheard a second-year student speak admiringly, and with certainty, of a brighter future. That student was Victor Babiuc. He was, indeed, first a brilliant jurist and teacher, and then, on several occasions, a brilliant minister.
He was among those who charted Romania’s Euro-Atlantic course, and took the necessary steps to make NATO integration and EU membership a dream come true. With intelligence, foresight and unrivalled competence, he shared his vision in his book, “O singură direcție: Apusul” (“A Sole Direction: Westward”), published in 2000.
Last summer, on the 25th anniversary of the launch of Romania’s Strategic Partnership with the United States, a terminal illness prevented Professor Babiuc from attending the conference organised by the Romanian Foundation for Democracy and the Institute for Advanced Studies in Levant Culture and Civilization in celebration of this major event in recent history. Despite his illness, ever the consummate professional, he endeavoured to deliver a message, dated July 5th, 2022, which ends as follows:
“Looking back on those years, I believe that the Romania of today is largely the result of the values and political reforms promoted in the period between 1997 and 2000; and I feel proud to have been part of that administration. Although we were not perfect – I don't think we ever could have been – and in spite of the fact that there were some mistakes, and that certain changes could have been implemented faster and more efficiently, together we opened a new path for Romania. A road that, until then, had been desirable but unlikely; and we showed that it was, indeed, walkable. We were the actors of a unique time, during which we outlined the future of Romania.”
Victor Babiuc unimpeachably fulfilled his duty to both country and to the Democratic Party of which he was a member in the 1990s, even if the envy and rancour of those that surrounded him have, over the years, come to wield a false sword of justice. However, above all else, Victor Babiuc fulfilled his duty to his own ideals, his beliefs, and to his destiny.
“We were the actors of a unique time, during which we outlined the future of Romania”
Victor Babiuc
I consider our meeting today as important as it is useful; it is not only pleasant to recall the political events in which we participated together a quarter of a century ago, as actors of what was probably the most important administration of the entire post-communist period, but It is likewise important, and useful, to recall them to those who lived through those times. However, above all, I think, it is important to present them to the younger generations, including an account of the special role that the 1996-2000 administration played for the post-communist evolution of Romania. This is a new and welcome opportunity to reflect on Romania’s historical destiny.
Romania’s situation in the middle of the final decade of the last century was not enviable, either domestically or internationally. Romanian society was in the throes of economic and social decay as a result of financial imbalances and inflation, the massive withdrawal of the Romanian industry from both domestic and international markets, and the destruction of the former socialist agriculture infrastructure following the privatisation of the agricultural cooperatives (CAPs). Privatisation, seen as the only viable solution for rebuilding the Romanian economy as a free and sustainable market economy, was stymied by a lack of domestic capital and the absence of conditions for attracting foreign capital. Romania could not stop the processes of either internal degradation or of the construction of a new society, as it lacked the necessary resources to do so; and it lacked them because of the difficult situation in which the Romanian state found itself in its international relations, owing to Western political, financial and economic elites’ lack of confidence of in the Romanian political elite led by Ion Iliescu. By 1996, it had already become abundantly clear – including to Romanians, themselves – that without a substitution of the PDSR government with a CDR-led government, Romania’s prospects of integration into the political, economic and security structures of the developed West were, at best, minimal. Even an important international victory of the PDSR government in 1992-1996 – the United States re-granting the status of Most Favoured Nation to Romania – did not take place until after CDR President Emil Constantinescu agreed to co-sign an official state letter to the US Congress, requesting the granting of the clause, with Ion Iliescu.
The victory of the CDR president in the presidential elections of November 1996 brought about a radical turning point, both in relations between Romania and the West and within post-communist Romania itself. This turning point was justified by the political programme of the new government, which was predicated on the value system of liberal democracy. I was part of this government since its inception in December 1996. As Minister of Defence until March 2000, I was also a member of the Supreme Council of National Defence, and had the opportunity to remain in close contact with the most important and difficult problems the government was facing: those that could affect the security of the country, the stability of the government and the continuity of the reform programme in all areas of Romania’s economic and social life. They were an extremely difficult four years, primarily on the domestic front. In the last decade of communist rule, which was followed by six years of centre-left (FSN/PDSR) government, Romania had accumulated major structural imbalances in its economy, its society and its international relations. This is why the Emil Constantinescu administration launched a vast programme of economic, social and international relations reforms designed to prepare Romania for its future integration into Western structures. It was difficult and, at times, harsh; but, in the end, the success of this programme was consecrated at the international level through the decision of the European Council to commence negotiations (Helsinki, December 1998) on Romania’s accession to the EU. It was probably the most important turning point in Romania's history – the first step on the road that would take our country from the periphery of the European continent and replace it within the most developed region of the world – the North Atlantic region.
There were also certain factors that made this success possible. The most important such was the confidence of the population that the new government was capable of bringing Romania into the EU and NATO. This allowed the government to negotiate with the trade unions and civil society, and to seek public opinion support for the reforms it envisaged and safeguard popular acceptance of the new social and political order that was taking shape. Political support from the EU, the US and NATO for the reform programme was, likewise, essential: firstly, for the legitimacy of the government and its members; secondly, for the support of the international financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, EBRD) regarding the financing requirements of the vast economic reforms and, above all, in order to encourage large international capital to invest in Romania (investments without which the vast process of privatisation was highly unlikely to succeed). Last but not least, it also mattered that the left-wing opposition was persuaded to at least partially support the reform programme; criticising it, naturally, by capitalising electorally on the social discontent that the negative consequences of the economic reforms were having on the population, but at the same time forcing the next left-wing government to continue with the reform programme we had initiated.
As far as I am concerned, as Minister of Defence we had a very difficult reform programme and a number of critical moments to overcome. The most difficult, and most important, was, of course, the programme to restructure the army, transforming it from an conscripted army, predicated on the philosophy of the participation of the entire populace in the defence of the homeland, into a professional force – a prerequisite for the use of weapons technically superior to those previously in use – that was about three times smaller and compatible with NATO military standards. This meant changing practically everything: from military theory, doctrine and regulations, to organisation, recruitment, training, specialisation, the relations of the armed forces with society and international relations and, last but not least, military equipment. This process had begun when Romania joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace, but changes were taking place relatively slowly both because of the many problems we were facing and because of the restrictive budget we had to work with – not least because of the lack of a clear political perspective for NATO membership (given that Romania was not invited to join during the 1997 NATO summit in Madrid).
Of the many critical moments we overcame, I will only mention two, both of which took place in 1999: the miners’ strike in January, and the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia in March-June. Some of you may remember that, following the programme to close down the mines in Valea Jiului, immediately after New Year’s Eve 1999 some 15,000 miners, supported by the population of Valea Jiului and Oltenia, began a march on the capital and, after routing the intervention troops of the Ministry of the Interior along the way, they endangered Bucharest, government stability and the democratic political regime in Romania. Under the state of emergency declared by Romania’s president, I ordered the army to block the miners’ advance so that the government could negotiate a political solution with them. The critical moment was that if the miners had attacked the army, it would have been forced to retaliate, which instead of resolving the crisis would only have exacerbated it. These were risky decisions taken by the President of Romania alongside with the government; but the crisis was, thankfully, resolved before it took a dramatic turn.
NATO's intervention in Yugoslavia required a different kind of ‘tightrope walking,’ this time at the international level, as NATO requested the use of Romania’s land and airspace for its air forces (which Romania agreed to), while Russia wanted free access to Romania’s airspace (which Romania did not extend). However, the decision to allow the use of Romania’s land and airspace by NATO forces could have been taken by Yugoslavia as an act of aggression against their country. It was another risky decision, in which I participated; and it turned out to be the correct one, as five years later, in 2004, it greatly contributed to Romania’s accession to NATO.
Looking back on those years, I believe that the Romania of today is largely the result of the values and political reforms promoted by the government and administration in the period between 1997 and 2000; and I feel proud to have been part of that process. Although we were not perfect – I don't think we ever could have been – and in spite of the fact that there were some mistakes, and that certain changes could have been implemented faster and more efficiently, together we opened a new path for Romania. A path that, until then, had been desirable, but unlikely; and we showed that it was, indeed, walkable. We were the actors of a unique time, during which we outlined the future of Romania.”
July 5th, 2022
